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SUMMARY
Innovation is a major driver of economic progress and a seemingly perpetual 
struggle for Canada. Supply-side innovation policies like research funding, tax 
credits and R&D subsidies have not delivered the expected results. Canadian 
governments should consider increasing their use of demand-side policies such 
as public procurement to support innovation.
Public procurement is the purchase of goods, services and works by government 
institutions and state-owned enterprises. For government, the focus in public 
procurement is often on cost minimization and risk avoidance. This approach 
comes with significant downsides. For example, insistence on low prices can 
squeeze small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) out of the bidding process. 
SMEs vastly outnumber larger firms in Canada and, given opportunities to 
innovate, they could provide a significant boost to employment and economic 
output.
Public procurement of innovation could stimulate local demand, further policy 
goals, turn society’s needs into market demands, help manufacturers achieve 
critical mass for production and lower production costs and ultimately help 
innovative firms grow and spread their novel solutions to more users.
Risk aversion is one of the biggest barriers to innovation procurement. Public-
sector buyers may be reluctant to buy novel solutions when the payoff takes too 
long or if they risk being blamed for careless spending. However, risks can be 
reduced through insurance, providing immunity to buyers for potential losses, 
third-party standards, or pocurement intermediation. 
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1Another major barrier to procuring innovation is the increased cost. Buying new products 
is incompatible with short-term cost minimization. Governments and public institutions 
need to broaden their cost-benefit analyses to include lifetime costs and benefits and 
account for the extra benefits generated by innovation. To encourage public organization 
to assume the price premium associated with novel solutions, particularly from SMEs, 
governments should consider setting up grants or other special funds for innovation 
procurement. This financial support does not necessarily require additional government 
spending. Governments at all levels can start by identifying existing programs in support 
of innovation, investment, economic diversification, or SMEs that are underperforming 
and redeploy some of these funds toward innovation procurement.
Public procurement of innovation is a complex process that requires additional training 
for public servants so they can assess opportunities and accurately communicate buyers’ 
needs and requirements. Corruption is a possible threat with open-ended specifications 
meant to encourage innovation. Free trade agreements may include provisions limiting 
public bodies’ ability to offer preferential treatment to domestic suppliers.
The European Union adopted three new directives in 2014 to support innovation in public 
procurement. They allow life-cycle costing to be considered when contracts are awarded, 
encourage authorities to break up contracts into lots so SMEs can participate and 
encourage preliminary market consultations between buyers and sellers.
Canada has been slower to adopt similar changes. The Jenkins panel, convened in 
2010 to review federal programs’ effectiveness in supporting R&D, found that Canada 
is over-reliant on supply-side innovation instruments as opposed to demand-side ones. 
Successive federal governments have begun to re-consider the innovation policy mix 
with the Build in Canada Innovation Program, Innovative Solutions Canada and Canada’s 
Innovation and Skills Plan. 
However there is more potential to change the system at the subnational level. Provincial 
and municipal governments are responsible for the bulk of the country’s public 
procurement, more than in any other OECD country. Provincial and local authorities 
are also in a better position to recognize concrete challenges in their constituencies, 
articulate them as needs and search for solutions. The province of British Columbia 
has been taking steps in this direction with a procurement strategy meant to support 
innovation. Some municipalities are also starting programs to support start-ups through 
challenge-based procurement. 
As these initiatives are still in the early stages, it makes sense for Canada to start small. 
Innovation procurement should focus on SMEs as the risks involved are smaller. Public 
organizations should identify needs and challenges that existing goods and services 
cannot meet, and where possible seek solutions with many small contracts instead of 
fewer, larger contracts. They should be open about those needs with the public and 
potential suppliers and choose the most suitable procurement model. 
Governments at every level should include innovation as a mandate in the procurement 
process and make the necessary reforms to embrace it. Ultimately, procurement reform 
to support innovation demands champions at the highest levels of policy-making circles 
and it also requires public belief that this is an effective approach to foster innovation and 
economic growth.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation is a key driver of economic progress and the subject of extensive scholarly 
research. It is also a subject of seemingly perpetual debate in Canada. Discussions around 
the disappointing level of innovation, its possible causes and potential solutions resurface 
periodically, both nationally and at the provincial level, under governments of all stripes. 
These discussions are inevitably followed by policy changes attempting to remediate this 
innovation deficit.
Traditionally, the support for innovation in Canada has rested predominantly on supply-
side policies in the form of direct funding for research, tax credits and other R&D 
subsidies, with limited use of demand-side policies for innovation, including public 
procurement (Edler 2019). However, interest in using public procurement and other 
demand-side policies to boost innovation appears to be on the rise recently, in part due 
to the underwhelming effectiveness of supply-side innovation policies (OECD 2011). 
In this study, I review the main government policies and recent trends in using public 
procurement for innovation purposes in OECD countries, including Canada. Based on 
these, I make some recommendations on how subnational Canadian governments and 
public institutions can better engage their procurement programs in supporting innovation.
Given the constitutional distribution of powers between levels of government in Canada, 
the bulk of public procurement is undertaken at the provincial and municipal levels, 
more so than in any other OECD country. Yet, the federal government owns the two 
most notable initiatives for using public procurement for innovation: the Build in Canada 
Innovation Program and Innovative Solutions Canada. There are some modest initiatives 
for the strategic use of procurement for innovation at the provincial level. A promising 
start is the British Columbia Procurement Strategy launched in 2018 which, for the first 
time, includes promoting innovation as an explicit objective. More attempts for innovation 
procurement have been made at the municipal level, but these initiatives appear for now 
sporadic and isolated. 
Public procurement is often focused on cost minimization and risk avoidance, while 
the development of innovative solutions typically comes with the additional costs and 
risks inherent to early stage product development. That means harnessing the potential 
of public procurement for boosting innovation can only be achieved if these two key 
challenges — increased costs and risks — are carefully considered and addressed. In 
addition, procurement specialists must be supported to acquire the set of skills necessary 
to assess these additional risks and costs and balance them against the potential benefits 
of the innovative products. Ultimately, the use of public procurement to stimulate 
innovation requires openness to new ideas, the identification and communication of 
challenges that are currently not being met by existing market solutions, and the political 
will to include innovation as an explicit objective of the procurement process and to 
provide adequate financial support for it.
3II. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND INNOVATION
Public procurement is the acquisition of goods, services and works by government 
institutions and publicly owned enterprises. The primary role of public procurement is 
to provide the tools that public institutions need to perform their functions. However, 
there is a growing recognition in both academia and among policy makers that besides 
enabling government organizations to fulfil their roles more effectively, purchasing 
innovative products can also influence the level of innovation in the private sector (OECD 
2011; Uyarra et al. 2014).
The link between public procurement and innovation can be established on two 
levels. For goods and services that are needed and already exist on the market, public 
procurement can be made more open to innovation, perhaps by including innovation-
related criteria in the tender documents, or at the very least making sure that innovative 
solutions are not disqualified due to outdated specifications or rigid contract terms. The 
other possibility is public technology procurement for a product or solution that does not 
exist but could be developed by private firms based on some functional requirements 
(OECD 2011, 35-36)
The history of using public procurement to achieve social outcomes can be traced back 
to at least 1840 (McCrudden 2004). Since then, using government contracting as a 
policy tool has gradually extended from promoting fair labour conditions and fair wages 
to providing employment opportunities for disabled workers, addressing unemployment, 
enforcing anti-discrimination laws or stimulating economic activity by disadvantaged 
groups. Today, strategic or mission-oriented procurement1 is engaged in three main 
directions: social procurement (concerned with generating community benefits from 
government purchases), green procurement (employed to achieve certain environmental 
goals or to purchase goods and services with a reduced environmental impact) and 
innovation procurement (purchasing novel solutions or adapting existing solutions to 
new uses).
Innovation procurement is perhaps the most prominent tool governments are using 
in their recent efforts to shift away from supply-side innovation policies toward more 
interventionist demand-side policies. Given the increasing prominence of innovation 
procurement, it is important to review the mechanisms through which public 
procurement programs can enhance innovation, along with the main advantages of this 
policy and the costs and risks associated with it.
At first glance, public procurement and innovation may appear to have different, and 
perhaps even contradictory, objectives. Through public procurement, governments and 
public institutions acquire the goods and services they need from the private sector. 
Price is one of the most important aspects in these transactions and contracts are often 
awarded to the lowest cost bidder. That typically means buying off-the-shelf products 
and solutions that have already been tried and tested and where economies of scale 
1 
Mariana Mazzucato has coined the term “mission-oriented” to describe innovation and innovation policy that aim 
to solve some societal challenges. Here, the term “mission-oriented” is borrowed to describe public procurement 
used for a scope that exceeds simply buying the goods and services that government bodies need.
4can be achieved through large-scale production. On the other hand, innovation entails 
bringing new products or processes to the market. The novelty element implies that the 
new product is likely not being produced in large enough quantities to minimize unit 
costs of production; that, plus the inherent risk associated with a new solution, implies 
that a higher price is to be expected. However, this innovation premium is justified given 
the policy mission of the innovation (Edler and Georghiou 2007, 957). 
The focus on lowest price in procurement contracts can be a potential deterrent for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) pursuing innovation, as their reduced scale 
is typically associated with higher production costs. This is the reason why evaluations 
based on a larger set of criteria like MEAT — the most economically advantageous 
tender, advocated by the European Union — are sometimes viewed as a way to give more 
advantage to innovative SMEs in winning public contracts. However, upon scrutiny, it 
appears that bid evaluation in terms of MEAT may not help SMEs compete, and, in fact, 
it increases large firms’ bids and success rates. This suggests that this type of policy 
may be counteractive to its intended purpose of increasing SMEs’ participation in public 
procurement contracts (Stake 2017). 
The debate on the capacity for innovation of small versus large firms, and the need for 
policy intervention to support their innovation, is ongoing. There is a view that large 
firms are more productive, create more jobs, are more innovative and have the capacity 
to create impactful innovation (Atkinson and Lind 2018; Mazzucato 2015). However the 
evidence appears more nuanced and sector-specific. Rothwell (1984, 312) finds great 
variation in the innovatory role of small firms across U.K. sectors when analyzing 2,200 
innovations in the U.K.’s economy between 1945 and 1980. Generally, small firms’ share 
of innovation was larger in sectors with relatively low entry and R&D costs (like scientific 
instruments or machine building), and much smaller in high capital/R&D costs (like 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals or aluminum production).
An extension of the idea that innovation is driven mostly by large firms — and the 
evidence from the EU’s MEAT evaluation framework — is the hypothesis that public 
procurement can only successfully stimulate innovation if the contracts are large, in 
order to drive costs down. This implies that buyers must be large as well. Along this line, 
Pickernell et al. (2011) (cited in Stake 2017) argue, based on data for public procurement 
in the U.K., that procurement at the subnational level cannot successfully stimulate 
innovation because of the small scale of government spending. What may be true for the 
U.K. may be quite different in Canada, however, given that Canadian governments spend 
significantly more at the provincial and municipal level than do other OECD countries, as 
will be discussed in a section below. 
Even if the argument stands that small firms are less likely to innovate, it can be 
interpreted as an argument in favour of more support for small businesses, not less 
since large firms are more likely to succeed on their own. This is particularly relevant in 
Canada, as small businesses exceed large businesses by far, not only in terms of sheer 
number, but also in terms of employment and economic output (Business Development 
5Bank of Canada n.d.).2 Empirical estimates by Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) of the impact 
of public procurement on firms’ share of sales from novel products suggest that public 
procurement is particularly beneficial for small firms in economically depressed areas, in 
their case eastern Germany.
A significant body of academic literature explores the link between public procurement 
and innovation from a theoretical standpoint. For Edler and Georghiou (2007) public 
procurement is an under-utilized instrument for driving innovation, whose use is justified 
on several rationales: to stimulate local demand (government acting as lead user, the 
creation of lead markets); to overcome market and system failures (risk and uncertainty, 
lack of trust, transaction, learning, entry and switching costs, etc.); to support normative 
policy goals (examples include sustainability or energy efficiency); to help translate 
societal needs into market demand. 
Dolfsma and Seo (2013) compare public procurement with other innovation instruments 
to develop a framework for deciding which type of policy is more effective depending 
on the context. They conclude that public procurement is the appropriate tool for 
stimulating innovation in situations where the technology develops in a cumulative 
manner, and network effects are low or absent. 
Dale and Bryson (2012, 11) summarize this literature and identify three main directions in 
which public procurement can be used to address the market failures typically associated 
with innovation:
1. By providing firms with a demonstrator to support diffusion of the innovation to 
other users (public-sector organizations and/or private); 
2. By helping firms to achieve the critical mass for production that enables a notable 
decrease in production costs. Having a large customer contracted also reduces 
significantly the market risk of developing a new product (Aschhoff and Sofka 
2009, 1236); 
3. By supporting the creation of new standards which facilitate knowledge spillovers 
and increase the incentives for firms to invest in R&D. 
However, using public procurement for innovation also comes with the risk that the new 
product may only serve a specific government need, with limited market applicability 
(Aschhoff and Sofka 2009). This risk seems particularly relevant for areas that are 
governments’ exclusive domain, like military procurement. On the other hand, defence 
research in the U.S. has been the starting point for some of the most significant 
inventions of the 20th century, such as semiconductors, cellular technology, the internet, 
GPS, etc. (Mazzucato 2015; Rothwell 1984).
Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2012) point out that the main goal of the public 
procurement of innovation is not the development of new products, but the fulfilment 
2 
According to the Business Development Bank of Canada, more than 98 per cent of businesses in Canada are 
small (fewer than 100 employees) and 55 per cent have fewer than four employees. Small businesses employ 
almost 70 per cent of private-sector workers. See https://www.bdc.ca/en/articles-tools/business-strategy-
planning/manage-business/pages/10-things-didnt-know-canadian-sme.aspx
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creation of a new product is not the target, but a consequence of the fact that existing 
products fail to assist these organizations in fulfilling their roles properly. The diffusion of 
the new product may or may not be one of the objectives of the procurement process. 
Not all procurement is equally conducive to innovation. Pre-commercial procurement is 
focused on acquiring research results, without a commitment to procuring the resulting 
product. Developmental public procurement of innovation involves completely new 
products or solutions and can result in radical innovation. Adaptive public procurement 
of innovation involves adapting an existing product to specific national/local conditions.
Besides the extensive theoretical literature on the potential for using public procurement 
for innovation, significant attention has been paid to studying the efficacy of supply-side 
innovation-oriented policies (particularly R&D tax credits). Yet there is significantly less 
empirical evidence when it comes to the impact of demand-side policies on innovation, 
including public procurement programs. In part, this stems from the difficulty of defining 
and measuring these variables. Firm-level data on involvement in public procurement 
are not readily available. At the same time, the measurement of innovation in itself is not 
without issues — there is no unique way of measuring what constitutes innovation and 
the degree of innovation (Cohn and Good 2013; OECD 2010).
Thus, with few notable exceptions, the empirical evidence is typically reduced to case 
studies documenting specific success stories in using public procurement programs 
for innovation in a particular country. Rothwell and Zegveld (1981)3 review some of 
the empirical evidence to date to conclude that, over the long run, state procurement 
resulted in more innovation in U.K. regions than did R&D subsidies. 
Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) investigate the effectiveness of public procurement and 
three other policy instruments4 on innovation based on survey data on the innovation 
activities of more than 1,100 German firms from 2003. Their measurement of innovation 
is given by a firm’s share of sales from novel products. Their findings suggest that, while 
public procurement was the least prevalent of the four policies, firms that engaged in 
it achieved a higher share of sales from new products (more innovation), compared to 
firms that received public funding. Their results also suggest that public procurement 
is particularly beneficial for smaller firms located in economically challenged regions 
(eastern Germany). This conclusion is in line with Rothwell’s (1984) proposition that public 
procurement can be a powerful tool for regional policy by stimulating innovation by small 
new firms, which are better able to adapt to changes than large, mature firms.
More recently, Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) analyzed 2009 Innobarometer survey data 
on over 5,000 firms from 14 EU countries that were treated to various innovation policy 
instruments. They investigated the impact on innovation of both supply-side instruments 
(R&D tax credits and subsidies) and public procurement, as well as the interaction 
between them. Their findings suggest that innovative public procurement is more 
effective than R&D grants in stimulating private expenditure on innovation inputs.
3 
As cited by Hanson (1982) and Cohen and Amorós (2014).
4 
Laws and regulation, university research as a catalyst for innovation and access to public funding.
7Case studies are more abundant in the literature, including OECD, EU5 and government 
reports on public procurement highlighting successful or cautionary stories. One 
academic study, Rolfstam (2013), presents eight successful instances of procurement 
of innovative products or services to infer the success factors behind them. The cases 
included are diverse, from the British National Health Service’s purchase of a silver-
coated catheter to reduce the risk of hospital-acquired infection, to a digital maritime 
radio system facilitating communication between ships and land-based entities in 
Norway, and building eight-storey wooden houses using passive energy by a municipality 
in Sweden. Some success factors inferred from these examples (or some of the necessary 
conditions to ensure the procurement of the innovative products) include: expertise on 
the public procurement procedures and relevant law; technical competence for functional 
specification; co-ordination and co-operation among procurers and other stakeholders 
(like future operators); managerial control and risk management; adequate resources and 
political support. 
III. CHALLENGES IN USING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TO 
STIMULATE INNOVATION
Risk is one of the most challenging aspects of using public procurement for innovation. 
From the buyer’s perspective, innovative solutions are risky to adopt.6 Moreover, public-
sector buyers tend to be more risk averse than private-sector buyers because the 
benefits of the innovative solution may take longer to materialize than the typical political 
cycle (Georghiou et al. 2014). In addition, audit bodies tend to criticize excessive risk-
taking more than insufficient risk-taking. On the other hand, the most significant risk 
suppliers face is that their offer of an innovative solution will not be accepted. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the procurement of innovation can include 
the purchase of new products, as well as the purchase of the research and development 
of new solutions for a particular need before they become commercially available (pre-
commercial procurement). In the second case, the government buys the research and 
development of the innovative solution without necessarily committing to purchase the 
product that may result from it. In addition, procurers may purchase R&D from multiple 
competing providers in order to identify the best solution to their challenge. The risk 
associated with this type of procurement is naturally smaller and comparable to the risk 
of undertaking in-house research for developing a solution.
However, even in the case of procuring innovative products, some solutions to mitigate 
the risks exist and have already been tested. One obvious way to reduce suppliers’ risk 
is to include clear requirements for innovation in the tender documents (Georghiou et al. 
2014). From a procurer’s perspective, solutions include providing financial incentives like 
price premiums to reduce the risk of procuring from SMEs, using third-party standards 
5 
The Innovation Procurement Platform features a variety of case studies and other resources intended to 
facilitate the exchange of information on the public procurement of innovation. See https://innovation-
procurement.org/resources/
6 
This risk may be higher in the case of procuring from small firms, as their capacity to fix problems that might 
arise is limited.  A large firm will be more likely to do so to protect its reputation.
8and certificates like quality labels to reduce the uncertainty associated with new 
products and the provision of insurance guarantees/immunity to buyers for potential 
losses incurred due to the procurement of innovative products.
The evolution of Korea’s New Technological Purchasing Assurance (NTPA) program (Box 1)  
offers an example of how product certification and buyer immunity clauses can reduce 
procurers’ risk and stimulate the public procurement of new technological products.
The risk associated with procurement of new solutions is real, but also perceived. An 
internal review by the Australian government found that risk aversion can lead staff 
to adopt processes even more stringent than the internal regulations in place. They 
also found that some of the procurement staff believed that some innovation-friendly 
procurement practices were against regulations even though, in fact, they were not. 
These findings reinforce the idea that public-sector employees tend to interpret internal 
regulations conservatively, rather than risk breaking the law (OECD 2015a, 59).
A second obvious challenge associated with the procurement of innovative solutions is 
the increased cost. Buying new products or solutions is virtually incompatible with cost 
minimization in the short term. The latter entails firms identifying and producing at their 
efficient scale of production, where all possible cost-reduction measures have been 
employed. This is highly unlikely for a new-to-the-market product. 
Governments and public institutions need therefore to weigh the short-term benefits of 
cost minimization against the long-term benefits of innovation and make the appropriate 
choice. In that sense, the typical cost-benefit analysis must be amended in two directions: 
to include lifetime costs and benefits7 as opposed to immediate short-term ones, and to 
account for the additional external benefits or the spillovers generated by innovation. An 
innovative product that may fail the cost-benefit test based on immediate benefits and 
costs may still be preferable to the status quo when lifetime benefits that accrue directly 
to the buyer, plus the additional spillover effects from which society at large benefits, 
exceed lifetime costs. The important question remains: Who should pay for the additional 
cost or the innovation premium — the buyer itself or the government at large? 
7 
This may be difficult to achieve in specific environments. For example, in the health-care context, the use of  
a new product or service may change the care process. Savings may be found in one area while costs may 
increase in another. Budgetary rigidity may prevent the transfer of savings from one part of the organization 
to another part that may experience higher costs. Or vice versa: adopting a solution in one part of the 
organization may cost more, but reduce the end-to-end cost of treatment, although no budgetary mechanism 
exists to transfer the reduced costs to the department experiencing higher costs at the point of adoption.
9Box 1. The New Technological Purchasing Assurance (NTPA) Program in Korea
Discussion based on Lee (2013) and OECD (2011).
NTPA was launched in 1996. In its initial form, the program required public institutions to give 
priority in their purchasing decisions to SMEs’ technological products that the government 
had approved for performance. However, no enforcement mechanism existed to ensure the 
procurement of these products would actually happen. A series of studies revealed that 
public organizations remained reluctant to purchase SMEs’ technology products for reasons 
that included lack of confidence in the quality of performance, lack of product performance 
verification and auditing concerns. 
The program was subsequently revised in 2005-2006 to include a performance certification 
system for SMEs’ technological products, as well as select the products that would qualify for 
preferred procurement. At the same time, a system was introduced that conferred performance 
insurance on the certified products. In addition, a clause was introduced that granted immunity 
to procurement managers in relation to potential losses resulting from the procurement of 
performance-insured products. 
With these revisions, public institutions were required to dedicate at least five per cent (in 2006), 
increasing to 10 per cent in 2010, of their procurement to this program. It was estimated that as 
a result of these revisions, the share of new technology products in the public procurement of 
all SME products rose from 2.2 per cent in 2001 to 9.3 per cent in 2009. A new regulation also 
mandated that new technology-certified products must represent at least 20 per cent of an 
item’s total procurement amount. 
The Korean NTPA program offers an example of successfully mitigating the risk inherent in 
procuring new solutions. A study by the Science and Technology Policy Institute based on survey 
data collected prior to the program’s 2005 revision revealed the program had a high recognition 
rate of more than 40 per cent among surveyed firms, although the utilization rate was less than 
10 per cent. The econometric analysis also revealed that the program had a significantly smaller 
impact on the firms’ innovation activities than tax incentives. However, from 2005 to 2012 the 
number of public organizations involved in using the NTPA increased from 18 to 36, and the 
number of supported firms from 87 to 254.
The additional costs are particularly critical for small buyers, which potentially leads 
to increased risk aversion of municipal governments and institutions. Procurement co-
operatives may offer a solution to this. Typically, this type of agreement is used to help 
small buyers aggregate their demand in order to negotiate better prices from their 
suppliers. In the case of procuring innovative products, a single collective contract may 
serve not necessarily to diminish suppliers’ market power, as much as to help them 
achieve the lower costs associated with the larger scale of a larger contract.8
A third challenge, related to the risk procurers face when buying new products, is the 
difficulty in measuring innovation, as noted above. The OECD’s Oslo Manual provides as 
close as practically feasible to a universally accepted definition of innovation. According 
to page 20 of the manual’s newly revised 2018 edition:
8 
From conversations with procurement specialists, it appears that partnering with similar buyers in order to  
reduce the acquisition price is better suited to consumable products. When it comes to the procurement of 
services that require customization, there is less advantage in bulk-buying.
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An innovation is a new or improved product or process (or combination thereof) 
that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes and that 
has been made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the 
unit (process). 
Yet even this widely accepted definition is quite vague in terms of assessing the degree 
of innovation. The task of assessing how much a product is improved and how it “differs 
significantly” from similar existing products is not trivial. It is even more difficult to assess 
how much this improvement is worth for society and therefore how much premium we 
are willing to pay for it, which is an essential piece of information for the cost-benefit 
analysis mentioned above.
A fourth major hurdle in using public procurement for innovation, closely related to the 
challenges mentioned above, is its complexity. Assessing the risk and potential rewards 
of procuring innovation products is not a trivial task. For a long time, procurement 
specialists have been expected to minimize costs and risks. Innovation procurement 
requires a significant change in mindset, as well as additional skills and training. For this 
reason, beyond political will and public discourse, building capacity is perhaps the most 
critical pre-condition for success in using public procurement to stimulate innovation. 
Building capacity takes time and political will and translates into additional costs for the 
authorities in charge.
In some situations the complexity can be mitigated through the use of procurement 
intermediation (Edler and Yeow 2016), where a knowledgeable third party, perhaps a 
government agency, brokers the link between the buyer and seller of the innovative 
solution. Innovative Solutions Canada, for example, publishes challenges issued by 
federal departments and agencies, and invites companies to submit novel solutions 
to these challenges, which they further help grow through direct funding (Innovative 
Solutions Canada n.d.). 
Adding another layer of complexity is a fifth challenge in the public procurement of 
innovation — the identification and communication of buyers’ needs and requirements in 
the tender process. For public procurement to allow and encourage innovative solutions, 
buyers’ requirements should take the form of functional specifications, which identify the 
needs without prescribing solutions (Georghiou et al. 2014). This difficult task comes with 
the risk of escalating costs. It is up to the buyers and their expertise to find the optimal 
set of restrictions. The fewer restrictions and parameters there are, the more room for 
innovation. But this comes with a higher risk of escalating prices and increased difficulty 
to evaluate the degree to which the final product serves the procuring body’s needs.
A sixth challenge in using public procurement for innovation is the potential for 
corruption.9 This is a major concern for public procurement in general but even more so 
in innovation procurement. If, as noted before, public tenders are designed with fostering 
innovation in mind, they will lack clear specifications of what the final product should 
look like. While this openness is precisely what makes innovation possible, it also raises 
9 
An issue related to the potential for corruption is the perception of corruption. Procurers may be skeptical to 
seek/accept innovative solutions to avoid the suspicion of corruption.
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the question of whether innovation-centred public procurement is more susceptible to 
corruption. This concern is reinforced by the previous point that the lack of clarity in 
specification may lead to higher costs, which makes corruption both more likely and harder 
to detect.
Finally, a major limitation in using public procurement for innovation is the legislative 
framework, including the free trade agreements that a country has signed. Since the 
purpose of free trade agreements is to encourage free(er) movements of goods and 
services, they often include restrictions that limit the extent to which public bodies can offer 
preferential treatment to nationals. These restrictions often take the form of a maximum 
threshold for contracts that can be awarded to preferred suppliers.10 A direct consequence 
of these restrictions is that, in practical terms, it will be easier to use public procurement to 
trigger innovation in SMEs, or at least for small contracts that fall below the procurement 
thresholds. 
IV. INNOVATION AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE
1. UNITED STATES
One of the earliest attempts to use public procurement to stimulate innovation is the U.S. 
National Bureau of Standards’ Experimental Technology Incentives Program (ETIP) from 
the 1970s.11 The program identified three ways in which government procurement could 
stimulate technological innovations and their diffusion:
1. By applying its buying power, the government can create a market for new products; 
2. Government procurement creates a demand pull for new technologies if it expresses 
its needs in functional or performance terms, leaving it to the industry to find new 
ways to respond to these needs;
3. Government as the first and largest buyer provides the opportunity to test innovative 
products.
10 
For example, under the New West Partnership Agreement between the Governments of British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, there is a threshold of $75,000 for institutions in the MASH sector 
(municipalities, academic institutions, school boards, and health regions/providers) where preference can be 
given to local firms for the procurement of goods and services. For contracts above this threshold, the MASH 
institutions must provide open and non-discriminatory access to businesses from the other provinces. The 
Canadian Free Trade Agreement, which includes all Canadian provinces and territories, has a higher threshold 
of $105,700 for goods and services procured by the MASH sector for 2020 and 2021. The threshold is higher 
still at SDR 200,000 (approximately $375,000) for goods and SDR 300,000 (approximately $561,000) for 
services under the Canada-European Union Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA). Other trade 
agreements are less restrictive. The new U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade agreement (USMCA) has eliminated some 
of the procurement provision included in NAFTA (Grier 2019). A list of the trade agreements of which Canada is 
a member can be found at https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-guidelines/policy-and-legal-framework/trade-
agreements#10.
11 
The ETIP discussion is based on Rothwell (1984).
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In order to seize these opportunities, the public procurement process was revised to 
include several novel approaches, among which are:
• Life-cycle costing — the use of the total cost normally incurred over the lifetime 
of a product in its evaluation;
• Value incentives clauses — the possibility for the manufacturer to share with the 
government some of the cost savings resulting from improved/innovative design 
of its products;
• Performance specifications — stipulation of performance standards that the 
products must meet;
• Sliding scale rating — the cost bid is reduced on a sliding scale for products 
offering a superior performance;
• Two-step procurement — manufacturers submit technical proposals prior to 
their cost proposal, to help determine the feasibility of innovation;
• Prototype purchasing — the producer sells a limited quantity of the innovative 
product which may lead to a larger government market upon successful testing.
ETIP was more than an experiment in using innovative procurement practices. It 
also addressed the adverse effect of existing securities regulations on the ability of 
start-up technology companies to access venture capital. While many deemed it a 
successful policy experiment, ETIP was cancelled in 1982 after 10 years. Two reasons 
for the cancellation are believed to be the program’s failure to produce an overall 
strategy integrating the individual policy experiments, and the difficulty in retaining the 
“multidisciplinary, analytical, highly motivated, and entrepreneurial staff” necessary to 
manage such an innovative program. However, the program was successful in getting 
government agencies to change some of their internal policies and experiment with new 
policy mechanisms (Tassey 2014).
Currently, in the U.S., the main program in support of innovation for small businesses is 
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR n.d.) program. This is a highly competitive 
program that encourages domestic small businesses to engage in federal research/
research and development (R/R&D) with the potential for commercialization. The 
program is funded through mandatory contributions; agencies with an extramural 
research budget greater than $100 million per year are required to contribute 3.2 per 
cent of this budget to the program. The program includes three phases. In phase I, up 
to $150,000 for six months can be awarded for businesses to investigate the feasibility, 
technical merit and commercial potential of an idea and for concept development. In 
phase II, up to $1 million can be awarded over two years for continuation of R/R&D 
efforts from phase I and for prototype development. Phase III is the commercialization 
phase, for which there is no SBIR funding, but award winners from phases I and II may be 
considered for sole-source contracts by government agencies (SBIR 2014).
Several other OECD countries (Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have 
national programs for innovation similar to the SBIR (OECD 2017a).
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2. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD)
The OECD Council on Public Procurement developed a series of recommendations 
to ensure “the strategic and holistic use of public procurement” (OECD 2015b). The 
starting point of this document is the growing interest in using public procurement 
to achieve public sector efficiency but also help fulfill other strategic objectives 
(innovation, job creation, support for small businesses, environmental protections). 
While efficient and effective public procurement is essential for the purpose of the 
government, it is also viewed as vulnerable to mismanagement, fraud and corruption. 
One of the key recommendations of this document for its adherents is to balance the 
use of their procurement system to pursue secondary objectives against its primary 
objective. The secondary objectives should be set in accordance to clear priorities 
and their benefits should be balanced against the need to achieve value for money. 
Adherents should develop strategies and action plans to integrate the secondary 
objectives into the procurement system and to monitor the effectiveness of the 
procurement system in achieving them. In particular, adherents should consider the 
capacity of the procurement body to support these secondary policy objectives and 
the additional workload associated with them.
In 2015, the OECD conducted the Survey on Strategic Innovation Procurement in 
order to inventory the current state of using procurement strategically to promote 
innovation within its member countries and outside. The survey covered 35 countries 
and found that 80 per cent supported using procurement for innovation, and 50 
per cent had developed an action plan for it (either stand-alone, or as part of their 
general innovation or procurement strategy). Countries submitted their definitions of 
procurement for innovation and details of their procurement for innovation programs, 
as well as good examples. The findings of this survey were summarized in a report on 
public procurement and innovation (OECD 2017a).
The report concluded that the main challenges in implementing procurement for 
innovation practices were risk aversion, management, personnel and skills, capacity 
and political support. It further suggested several necessary directions for government 
action to achieve success in the strategic use of procurement for innovation:
• Demonstrate political leadership and commitment for the procurement of 
innovation; 
• Cultivate a culture that is more open to embracing risk and new ways of doing 
things;
• Build up the capacity required to implement this strategy (both quantity and 
quality of skilled staff);
• Encourage horizontal and vertical co-operation between different branches of 
the public procurement process, as well as different levels of government; 
• Communicate about the positive outcomes of innovation. 
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Based on the survey’s findings, the OECD elaborated upon a general framework 
intended to assist countries in expanding their own programs for the strategic use of 
procurement of innovation (Box 2).
OECD identifies public procurement as one of the areas of government activity most 
susceptible to corruption and has a set of recommendations on preventing corruption 
in public procurement (OECD 2016). Some of the issues around corruption in public 
procurement identified in this document are particularly relevant for innovation 
procurement. Corruption risks increase with the complexity of the procurement process 
and the existence of close interaction between government officials and businesses. 
Integrity risks exist at every stage of the procurement process, from the lack of adequate 
need assessment before the tendering phase to deficient supervision by public officials 
of the way suppliers perform their contract. Procurement at subnational level may be 
more or less susceptible to corruption as local officials tend to be more accountable to 
their constituencies but also closer to local businesses. SMEs are more susceptible to 
corruption than larger companies as they lack the time and resources to comply with 
complex regulations, tend to be less concerned with reputation and more focused on 
short-term outcomes.
The OECD recommendations to prevent corruption are formulated around a set of 
general principles. Particularly relevant to innovation procurement are the need for 
transparency (ensuring open access to information, levelling the playing field for all 
businesses), integrity (setting specific standards for procurement officials and rules and 
procedures to manage conflict of interest), oversight and control (developing oversight 
mechanisms to support accountability throughout the public procurement cycle) and 
the implementation of e-procurement (to increase transparency and competition, reduce 
contact between officials and companies, and help detect irregularities).
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Box 2. Nine Areas of Action for the Development and Implementation of Strategic  
Procurement of Innovation (OECD 2017a)
1. Policies and targets: Public procurement for innovation must be used in co-ordination with 
other policy areas and policy strategies with defined targets must be included within any 
national, subnational and regional innovation policy. 
2. Legal framework: To make the procurement of innovation possible, a clear legal framework 
must be established, including definitions, guidelines and templates.
3. Effective management: Procurement of innovation is complex and requires multidisciplinary 
teams and effective leadership to manage this increased complexity. Innovation agencies can 
also broker the link between buyers and suppliers.
4. Capacity: Adequate capacity and skills are critical for the success of innovation procurement. 
These can be built through specific training and the creation of multidisciplinary teams, as 
well as competence centres focused on public procurement for innovation. 
5. Financial support: Given its increased cost, it is imperative to provide the financial support 
for the procurement of innovation in the form of sufficient budgets, funds and other financial 
incentives (grants, awards, etc.). 
6. Risk management and impact assessment: Understand the potential risks and rewards 
associated with the procurement of innovative products, and take steps to reduce loss  
and damage.
7. Awareness and stakeholder engagement: Given its relative novelty, procurement of 
innovation must be advertised through many channels, including the publication of good 
practices and success stories, organization of workshops and seminars to share these 
experiences, creation of a dedicated knowledge-sharing platform, etc. Early stakeholder 
engagement is also critical.
8. Standardization: Define test standards, methods and quality certificates which can 
incentivize innovation (example: energy efficiency).
9. E-procurement: Use appropriate e-procurement and information technology (IT) tools 
to standardize the procurement process, promote transparency and discourage fraud/
corruption.
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION12
In 2010 the European Commission developed Europe 2020, its new strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission 2010) built around seven 
themes. Under the “Innovation Union” initiative, public procurement is identified as 
one of the demand side policies (in addition to smart regulations) to help re-focus EU’s 
innovation policy to challenges facing its society. Procurement is also included in the set 
of industrial policy instruments to support innovation activities, particularly by SMEs.
In 2011, the EU defined its new framework programme for research and innovation, 
Horizon 2020 which currently provides funding for two types of innovation procurement: 
Public Procurement of Innovative solutions (PPI) and Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) 
(European Commission n.d.)
12 
The European Union has a wealth of resources on the procurement of innovation that can be difficult to 
navigate. The following discussion is non-exhaustive and covers some of the key points in the evolution of 
innovation procurement in EU.
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In 2014 the EU modernised its public procurement framework with three new directives 
reflecting new economic and technological trends, including a framework for the 
procurement of innovation. To better support member states in advancing their own 
procurement of innovation, in 2018 the European Commission released a Guidance on 
Innovation Procurement which clarifies the innovation procurement concept, outlines the 
policy framework for it, and provides practical advice on its implementation. (European 
Commission 2018).
The new directives and the Guidance reinforce the value-for-money focus, however full 
life-cycle costing can and should be considered when awarding contracts. The Most 
Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) criteria combines considerations on price 
and cost. The cost component should be calculated based on an objective life-cycle 
costing methodology that reflects the monetary value of the production, acquisition, 
use, consumption, maintenance, interconnecting, recycling and/or disposal of the good 
contracted.This could encourage the adoption of more innovative solutions, even if 
initially more expensive, if they can be shown to lead to savings/improved performance 
over the longer term. In order to attract investors and to stimulate SME participation, 
contracting authorities are encouraged to break the contracts into lots and to design 
SME-friendly payment schemes.
In 2018, the Procurement of Innovation Platform13 published its own guide for public 
authorities on public procurement of innovation (Semple 2018). This document outlines 
practical steps for procuring innovation under the new EU directives. Selecting the most 
suitable innovation procurement procedure is not always straightforward. The choice 
depends on several factors, including the degree of knowledge about the solution being 
procured and the possibility of developing technical specifications for it. To assist public 
authorities in identifying the best procedures for their needs, the guide includes a useful 
scheme illustrated in Figure 1 below.
The procurement guide also outlines the main issues to be considered when creating a 
public procurement for innovation (PPI) strategy: needs assessment; creating the project 
team and steering group; making a business case for PPI, including the calculation of 
future costs and savings; considering the possibility of joint procurement; deciding when/
how to engage suppliers; legal aspects; life-cycle costing; risks and financial support.
13 
While funded from an EU Horizon 2020 research grant, the Innovation Procurement Platform is an 
organization independent of EU, providing resource on current developments and best practices in 
innovation procurement. https://innovation-procurement.org/
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FIGURE 1. PROCEDURES FOR PROCURING INNOVATION
Source: Semple (2018)
V. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT FOR INNOVATION IN CANADA
FEDERAL LEVEL
The disappointing state of innovation in Canada, particularly as measured by the level 
of R&D spending, has been a constant concern for policy-makers over the last few 
decades.14 In 2010, the federal government appointed an expert panel (the Jenkins panel) 
to undertake a review of the federal programs’ effectiveness in supporting business 
and commercially oriented R&D and the final report (Canada. Industry Canada 2011a, 
henceforth referred to as “the Jenkins report”) was released in October 2011. The panel 
identified the need to support the growth of small innovative firms into larger enterprises 
as a key element in addressing Canada’s innovation challenges. It also identified the 
insufficiency of demand-side policies for innovation as a weakness of the Canadian system. 
The panel’s six main recommendations included, on the demand side, making business  
innovation one of the core objectives of public procurement. On the supply side,  
the panel recommended both a shift in focus from indirect support in the form of  
R&D tax credits to more direct support initiatives to benefit small and medium-sized 
14 
Canada’s R&D intensity or the share of GDP spent on R&D peaked at 2.02 per cent in 2001, when it was also 
the closest to the OECD average of 2.16 per cent. Since then, the OECD average increased steadily to 2.37 
per cent in 2017, while Canada slipped to 1.59 per cent in 2017, and even further to 1.55 per cent in 2018. Data 
from https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm. 
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enterprises, as well as redefining the base of the R&D tax credit for SMEs as labour-
related costs, for simplification.15 
Regarding the strategic use of public procurement to stimulate innovation, the Jenkins 
panel report outlined the potential for the acquisition of innovative products to both 
boost productivity and lower costs in the public sector, as well as to contribute to the 
viability and growth of innovative firms, particularly SMEs. The mechanisms through 
which public procurement could help such firms include facilitating their debt and equity 
financing through the prospect of sales, showcasing/marketing their products and 
stimulating the output toward the critical mass required for economies of scale. At the 
same time, the panel emphasized that the use of these policies must be justified based 
on cost-benefit principles and balanced against Canada’s trade obligations, the risk of 
cultivating supplier dependency and the risk of hampering competition.
The report noted the modest use of public procurement for innovation in Canada, 
compared to other developed countries, and proposed a series of changes to accelerate 
this practice. These included:
• Making innovation an explicit objective in procurement policies; 
• Formulating procurement requests for proposals in terms of needs/problems to 
be addressed rather than detailed technical specifications; 
• Setting targets for external R&D contracting (including a sub-target for SMEs, 
similar to the U.S.’s Small Business Innovation Research program); 
• Increasing the scope of the Canadian Innovation and Commercialization 
Program (CCIP);
• Increasing collaboration among the federal, provincial and municipal 
governments in terms of sharing best practices and developing joint strategies 
for the effective use of public procurement to advance innovation.
Given the central role that smart procurement could potentially play in stimulating 
innovation, the expert panel further issued a special report on procurement (Canada. 
Industry Canada 2011b). The report summarized some of the opportunities and 
challenges of using government procurement to support business innovation, with 
emphasis on defence and security-related procurement, one of the main areas of 
jurisdiction for federal procurement.
Two possible reasons for Canada’s lack of success in fostering innovation advanced in the 
literature, including in the Jenkins report, are (1) the over-reliance on indirect support/
tax subsidies as opposed to direct funding on the supply side, and more generally (2) the 
over-reliance on supply-side instruments as opposed to demand-side ones. 
15 
Since 2014, capital expenditures have been excluded from the definition of qualified SR&ED expenditures  
for investment tax credits. Currently, SR&ED qualified expenditures include mainly expenditures of a 
current nature (wages, materials), plus 80 per cent of contract R&D expenditures. While generally SR&ED 
expenditures are dominated by labour-related costs, the actual extent depends on the sector. Both the 
Jenkins panel recommendation and the federal exclusion of capital expenditures from allowable SR&ED 
expenditures tend to discourage capital-intensive R&D.
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Indeed, fiscal instruments to stimulate the amount of R&D in the form of deductions 
for current and capital spending, R&D tax credits, super deductions, super allowances, 
etc., have been used in Canada for more than seven decades at the federal level16 and 
more than 35 years at the provincial level.17 Despite recent reductions in the scope of the 
federal Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) Program,18 Canada 
continues to rely disproportionally more on tax support for R&D and less on direct 
government funding compared to other OECD countries, and to offer significantly larger 
R&D subsidies for SMEs compared to large firms (Appelt, Galindo-Rueda, and Cabral 
2019, 20-21). 
The federal government has taken steps to change the innovation landscape in some 
of the directions suggested by the Jenkins report, particularly with the new Innovation 
Agenda launched in Budget 2016 (Canada. Department of Finance 2016, 109).19 In Budget 
2017, the federal government launched Canada’s Innovation and Skills Plan, “an ambitious 
effort to make Canada a world-leading centre for innovation” (Canada. Department of 
Finance 2017, 44). One of its targets is to increase Canadian business expenditures in 
research and development as a share of GDP to the OECD average by 2025, which would 
require a 70 per cent increase of these expenditures from the $17.6 billion (in 2017) to 
$30 billion by 2025 (Government of Canada n.d.)
Regarding the support for innovation through public procurement, in 2010, the federal 
government launched a program for the procurement of innovative pre-commercial 
goods and services. The program became permanent in 2012, as the Build in Canada 
Innovation Program (BCIP). The program used a continuous intake process, in which 
applications could be submitted any time. Proposals were then evaluated by the National 
Research Council of Canada Innovation Assistance Program (NRC-IRAP), and successful 
proposals were then referred to potential clients in the federal government. BCIP had 
four standard20 priority areas: environment, health, enabling technologies, and safety 
and security, with a funding limit of $500,000 per innovation. To be eligible, innovations 
were required to have a technology readiness level (TRL) of at least seven, meaning 
a prototype existed already and was ready for demonstration in an operational (not 
simulated) environment (OSME and PSPC n.d.). From 2010 to 2019, the BCIP awarded 
398 contracts with a value of more than $170 million and helped over 80 per cent of 
participating businesses to commercialize their innovation within 12 months of contract 
completion. (Canada. Public Services and Procurement Canada 2019, 12-13).
16 
For a timeline of the main fiscal instruments for stimulating R&D at the federal level, see https://www.canada.
ca/en/revenue-agency/services/scientific-research-experimental-development-tax-incentive-program/
evolution-program-a-historical-perspective.html. 
17 
For an extensive discussion of R&D support in Canada at the federal and provincial levels and their  
interaction, see Crisan and McKenzie (2017).
18 
In 2013, the eligibility of contract payments for SR&ED purposes was reduced to 80 per cent of the contract’s 
value. In 2014, the definition of eligible expenditures for SR&ED purposes was narrowed by removing capital 
expenditures.  In addition, the general SR&ED investment tax credit was reduced from 20 per cent to 15 per 
cent effective Jan. 1, 2014, and lease costs can no longer be claimed for SR&ED purposes.
19 
Sulzenko (2016) reviews extensively the federal initiatives in support of R&D and innovation in general, five 
years after the Jenkins report, and how they match the Jenkins panel’s recommendations. 
20 
BCIP also had six military priority areas (cyber security, command and support, in-service support, protecting  
the soldier, arctic and maritime security, and training systems) with a funding limit of $1,000,000 per innovation. 
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For proposals not yet at the prototype level, Budget 2017 announced a new procurement 
program as part of the Innovation and Skills Plan — Innovative Solutions Canada (ISC). 
The purpose of the program was to replicate the successful U.S. SBIR program, with 
federal departments and agencies allocating a portion of their funding towards early-
stage research and development, late-stage prototypes and other goods and services 
from Canadian innovators and entrepreneurs. (Canada. Department of Finance 2017, 86). 
In 2018 the purpose of ISC became more clear: ISC would post challenges issued by 20 
federal department or agencies, and invite small businesses to develop new products or 
applications in response to those challenges (Canada. Innovation, Science and Economic 
Development Canada 2019, 18-19). 
ISC is a multi-stage program, looking for solutions to these challenges “at the earliest 
level of technological development”. In phase I, solutions with a TRL of one to four are 
proposed and may receive up to $150,000 in funding over six months to develop and 
deliver a proof of concept. Eligible21 small businesses that successfully complete phase 
I can move to phase II, where a maximum of $1 million over two years can be awarded 
for developing and delivering a prototype. In phase III, a federal department may 
choose to fund additional research and/or procure the novel technology or service 
from Canadian small business through a separate procurement process. (Innovative 
Solutions Canada 2019).
Budget 2018 streamlined22 the federal governemnt’s suite of innovation program, 
including the consolidation of BCIP, previously administered Public Services and 
Procurement Canada, into ISC, under the administration of Innovation, Science and 
Economic Development Canada (Canada. Department of Finance. 2018, 109). The 
consolidated ISC program has two streams: a challenge stream (the original ISC) and a 
testing stream (the former BCIP) with a budget of $100 million. The program continues to 
be geared toward small businesses and encourages submissions from businesses owned 
by women, Indigenous peoples, youth and visible minorities, thus including elements of 
both innovation and social procurement. (Canada. Innovation, Science and Economic 
Development Canada 2020, 22)
When considering the opportunity of using public procurement as a means of boosting 
business innovation, it may seem natural to start with the central government as 
innovation promoter. However, in many federal states, and particularly in Canada, the 
potential to stimulate innovation through public procurement may be even greater at 
the subnational level. The reason for this is that Canada is one of the most decentralized 
OECD countries by several dimensions. Canada had the largest share of total public 
expenditure at subnational level in OECD (76.2 per cent compared to the OECD average 
of 40.4 per cent) and the second largest share of subnational expenditure in GDP in 
21 
Two of the eligibility conditions for the ISC program is that businesses must have no more than 499  
employees and 50 per cent of wages, salaries and fees should be paid to employees or contractors that 
spend the majority of their time working in Canada.
22 
Part of the streamlining process is the new Innovation Canada interface launched in January 2018 with the 
purpose of providing a single point of contact for Canadian entrepreneurs looking to grow their business, 
connecting them to all government programs and services that suit their profile, including those at provincial 
and territorial level.
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OECD (31.6 per cent compared to the OECD average of 16.2 per cent) in 2016 (OECD 
2018 Fig. 5.1 p. 115). Canada also had the second largest share of public investment at 
subnational level in OECD in 2016 (87.6 per cent versus the OECD average of 61.1 per 
cent) and the largest share of subnational investment in GDP (3.4 per cent versus OECD 
average of 1.9 per cent) (OECD 2018, 125).
Looking closer at each level of government, in Canada the federal government 
undertook only 24.5 per cent of general government expenditures in 2015, the provincial 
government was responsible for 47.5 per cent (the largest share in OECD),23 the local 
government for 21.1 per cent and social security for an additional seven per cent. By 
contrast, the average for OECD was 41.0 per cent of general government expenditures 
contracted by the central government, 23.3 per cent by state, 15.6 per cent by local 
government, and 20.1 per cent social security (OECD 2017b, 81).
Compared to other OECD countries, Canada also displays a larger share of public 
procurement24 in government expenditure (32.7 per cent in Canada versus an OECD 
average of 29.1 per cent in 2015) and a larger share of public procurement in GDP (13.4 
per cent in Canada, 11.9 per cent OECD average in 2015). The largest contributors to 
procurement spending in OECD, on average, are health (29.8 per cent), economic affairs 
(17.0 per cent), education (11.9 per cent), defence (10.1 per cent), and social protection (9.8 
per cent), however with large variations from country to country.25 (OECD 2017b, 173). 
Canada not only has a larger than average share of public procurement in government 
expenditure and GDP, but also the largest share of procurement at the subnational level 
of all OECD countries, almost seven-fold the federal government’s share. 
23 
The U.S. has a combined share of 48.5 per cent of expenditures contracted at state and local level, but it is 
unlikely that the state share alone exceeds the provincial share of 47.5 per cent in Canada.
24 
The OECD defines general government procurement as “the sum of intermediate consumption (goods  
and services purchased by governments for their own use, such as accounting or information technology 
services), gross fixed capital formation (acquisition of capital excluding sales of fixed assets, such as building 
new roads) and social transfers in kind via market producers (purchases by general government of goods and 
services produced by market producers and supplied to households).”
25 
Israel and the U.S. spend significantly more than the OECD average on defence procurement (28.4 per cent 
and 21.3 per cent, respectively), while Belgium spends disproportionally more on health procurement (47.0 
per cent) and disproportionally less on defence (only 1.4 per cent).
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This ranking is not surprising, given the roles and responsibilities of each level of 
government in Canada. Health care, education and social welfare, some of the largest 
areas in public procurement, are predominantly the responsibilities of provincial and 
municipal governments. As the spending needs in these sectors have increased steadily 
over the past decades, so has the share of procurement under the responsibility of 
provincial and municipal governments, as evidenced in Figure 3 below.
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FIGURE 3. USE OF GOODS AND SERVICES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
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PROVINCES
Despite their predominant share in public procurement, there are no programs yet in 
place for using procurement for innovation at the provincial level, similar to the federal 
one. Provinces are even better positioned in Canada to support innovation through 
procurement, given their constitutional responsibilities and the scale of their procurement 
programs. Perhaps such programs will be developed in the future, independent of or in 
conjunction with the federal programs, similar to the provincial support for R&D in the 
form of tax incentives that supplement the federal program.
Some provinces are taking steps in this direction. The new British Columbia Procurement 
Strategy (B.C. Ministry of Citizens’ Services 2018) aims, among other things, to 
promote innovation, and to improve “social, Indigenous and environmental outcomes”. 
While concrete policies are still being developed, this is a first example of a provincial 
program with emphasis on the procurement of innovation, as well as green and social 
procurement. A first step in the direction of driving innovation through procurement 
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was the creation of a new “‘procurement concierge’ program, to act as a matchmaker 
between government buyers and suppliers of innovative products”, which sounds similar 
in mandate to the federal BCIP.
British Columbia is also one of the first jurisdictions in Canada to launch a Start-up in 
Residence program, modelled after a similar San Francisco initiative started in 2014. The 
idea is to bring together start-up tech companies and government institutions to co-
develop technology solutions that respond to specific challenges these institutions face 
in delivering their services (similar to what the ISC intends to achieve at the federal level). 
At the end of the residency period, companies receive, among other things, $10,000 for 
their participation, full rights to commercialize their solution and the ability to reference 
the B.C. government as a customer (Government of British Columbia, n.d.).
The Alberta government’s support for innovation has waxed and waned. For a long time, 
Alberta was the only province, besides Prince Edward Island, without a provincial tax 
credit for R&D. In 2009, a provincial SR&ED tax credit of 10 per cent was introduced. This 
credit was cancelled in the October 2019 budget, together with four other business tax 
credits, including the Alberta Investor Tax Credit introduced in 2017, which provided 30 
per cent tax credits (up to $60,000 per year) for investments in targeted growth areas 
like clean technology and digital animation.26 The rationale behind the elimination of 
these tax credits was a return to a broad-based, low-rate tax system, through elimination 
of targeted tax credits and an across-the-board corporate tax rate reduction from 12 
per cent to eight per cent by 2022. However, only two months later, the government 
expressed exploring the idea of allowing technology companies to issue flow-through 
shares to help them attract capital investment (Stephenson 2019). In June 2020 the 
Government of Alberta announced the Alberta’s Recovery Plan (Government of Alberta 
2020) to help its economy recover from the crisis due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
global recession and oil price collapse. The plan includes advancing the reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate to eight per cent to Jul 1, 2020 and the introduction of the 
Innovation Employment Grant for companies that invest in research and development to 
incentivize job creation in high growth new industries. The recovery plan also announced 
the committment to release a technology and innovation strategy in fall 2020.
Alberta does not have any notable initiatives in public procurement of innovation yet. 
However, there are increasing calls to reform and modernize the procurement process. In 
2019, an expert panel on Alberta finances recommended the creation of a procurement 
council to examine, in collaboration with businesses and industry, innovation and 
efficiency in the government’s procurement methods. One purpose would be to increase 
access to procurement opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises. The panel 
also recommended refreshing the provincial procurement policy to achieve best value for 
money through innovative partnerships and other innovative procurement solutions (Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Alberta’s Finances 2019, 57).
26 
The other three credits cancelled were the Alberta Capital Investment Tax Credit, the Community Economic 
Development Corporation Tax Credit and the Interactive Digital Media Tax Credit. Cancelling these five tax 
credits was estimated to save $400 million by 2022-2023.
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While the focus of this paper is increasing the role of public procurement in stimulating 
innovation, anecdotal evidence suggests that the private sector in Canada is not 
particularly open to innovation either, that Canada is great at producing new ideas but 
not necessarily at commercializing them, and that Canadian entrepreneurs are often 
advised to commercialize their new products elsewhere, notably in the U.S., before 
being able to sell them to Canadian companies. One reason for this seeming resistance 
to change appears to be a high degree of risk aversion in both the public and private 
sectors in Canada. Private companies, like the government sector, appear unwilling to 
take the risk of embracing new solutions if existing ones work reasonably well. It may 
therefore be the case that governments can encourage innovation, particularly from 
small firms, not only by opening their procurement to them, but also helping them sell 
their ideas to the private sector. 
The Alberta Small Business Innovation and Research Initiative (ASBIRI) was designed to 
do just that. Run by Alberta Innovates in collaboration with other Alberta ministries and 
agencies, this multi-phase pilot program looked to match specific challenges identified 
by industry partners or the public sector with SMEs able to provide solutions to those 
challenges. Currently, the program is fully subscribed and will not issue new challenges 
(Alberta Innovates n.d.-a) likely as a result of a shift in priorities by the new government 
following the 2019 election. 
Some of the success stories credited to the ASBIRI include a new real-time pipeline 
monitoring and leak detection technology developed by Alberta-based Hifi Engineering 
in response to a challenge posted by TC Energy (formerly TransCanada Corporation) and 
Enbridge Inc. (Hifi Engineering n.d.), a new technology for earlier detection of prostate 
cancer developed by DynaLIFE (Alberta Innovates 2018) and a non-invasive blood test 
for breast cancer developed by Synatra (Alberta Innovates 2019). Also underway through 
the ASBIRI is the Municipal Community Generation Challenge (Alberta Innovates n.d.-b), 
funded by the Municipal Climate Change Action Centre and Alberta Innovates, which 
looks to municipalities to provide sustainable solutions toward low-carbon, community-
scale electricity generation, whose data and knowledge can later be transferred to other 
municipalities in Alberta. 
MUNICIPALITIES
Some early initiatives are also starting to happen at the municipal level. An example is the 
City of Guelph’s Civic Accelerator initiative from 2016. This was a pilot project developed 
by the Guelph Lab in which the municipality invited submissions of innovative solutions 
to complex municipal problems, like detecting leaks and reducing water use, maximizing 
the value of parking space downtown and making it easier for the public to provide 
feedback on planning. The following year, Guelph published a case study report based 
on this experience, and officials are looking at expanding the Civic Accelerator project in 
partnership with Barrie and London (Huynh 2019). 
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Inspired by Guelph’s initiative, the City of Toronto is looking at challenge-based 
procurement as a potential solution to tackling some of its problems (Coop 2019). 
Municipalities across Ontario have also hosted a series of reverse trade shows for the last 
few years, as a way for local businesses to learn about local procurement opportunities.27 
Edmonton has also been a pioneer in Canada (Kornik 2018) in terms of launching its own 
Start-up in Residence program (now known as City Innovate). In October 2018, Edmonton 
launched three challenges to be solved over a 16-week period: a vandalism detection and 
prevention system, a chatbot to reduce the number of 311 routine calls and a mobile app 
to deliver information to users about the optimal blend of transportation options (Startup 
Edmonton 2018). Currently, Innovate Edmonton is in the early stages of preparing the 
next Start-up in Residence challenge.
There are also some examples of green and social procurement initiatives at the 
subnational level in Canada. Green procurement certainly overlaps with the procurement 
of innovation, in the sense that many of the green solutions of tomorrow are likely not 
in use today, and maybe not even invented. However, innovation in general has a much 
larger scope than green innovation. Stating that procurement of innovation is an explicit 
government objective would be a very important step in the direction of more and better 
demand-side government support for innovation.
Public procurement intiatives and particularly green procurement can also overlap with 
regulation, the other significant demand-pull instrument, to stimulate innovation. In 2004, 
Vancouver became the first North American city to require that all municipal buildings 
over 500 square metres achieve the LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design) Gold Green building credentials. This was followed by a similar request for 
the private-sector brownfield redevelopment of Southeast False Creek for the 2010 
Olympics. Next came a series of incentives to encourage the private sector to adopt 
greener building standards. These strategies have resulted in the largest number of 
LEED-certified buildings in North America, a significant growth in the green building 
sector in Vancouver (green products, services, consultancies), and also the creation of a 
“Vancouver brand” that now sells its products and services across North America (Cohen 
and Amorós 2014).
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INCREASING THE USE OF 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TO STIMULATE INNOVATION AT THE 
PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL LEVELS
The procurement of innovative goods and services by the public sector may be an 
answer to Canada’s innovation problem but, as seen above, it comes with a significant 
set of challenges. A good place to start would be to focus on the procurement of 
novel solutions mostly from small and medium-sized enterprises. Starting small makes 
particular sense in Canada, where mission-oriented procurement is still in its early stages.
27 
For some examples, see https://www.opba.ca/insidepages/content/index.cfm?newsid=4661A5D5-5056-
8960-3E48-3B60B501C630; https://www.sootoday.com/local-news/supply-ontario-reverse-trade-
show-183735; https://www.bramptonguardian.com/news-story/9330287-more-than-200-vendors-signed-up-
for-brampton-reverse-vendor-trade-show-on-may-2/ .
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A focus on small firms is not just the second-best, easier thing to do. There are both 
theoretical and empirical arguments to suggest that public procurement can be 
particularly helpful to stimulate growth and innovation in small firms. The U.S.’s SBIR 
program, similar SBIR-type programs existing or proposed in other OECD countries 
and Canada’s own ICS, focus on small businesses. Increasing the opportunity for 
SMEs’ participation in public procurement is viewed as an important step for fostering 
innovation and growth in Ontario28 and in Australia.29 
Some of the advantages of starting small are:
- Compliance with the existing legislative framework, including trade agreements
Since the existing legislation puts a cap on the size of contracts that can be awarded 
by giving preference to local firms, it may be prudent to start with contracts that do 
not require legislative changes. While such a restriction may limit the usefulness of 
procurement as an innovation policy tool, it can be potentially circumvented, where 
technically feasible, by breaking bigger challenges into smaller components, each with 
its own procured solution. In fact, contracts that are too large can act as a barrier to 
innovation, as they exclude smaller and potentially more agile firms from competing. 
Spliting large projects and contracts into several components can level the playing 
field, increase SME participation, and potentially reduce the contracted price due to the 
increased competition (Brown 2011, Knutsson and Thomasson 2014)
- Reduced risk and complexity 
Not all areas are equally suited for innovation procurement, either due to the maturity of 
the area or the need for safety, reliability and reasonable costs for large-scale projects. 
In major infrastructure projects, the risk of trying a new technical solution cannot 
be assumed without extensive and expensive testing. Small contracts are unlikely to 
involve solutions to very complex problems, and therefore the risks associated with 
these contracts (for example, the risk that the contracted solution will not perform as 
expected) are easier to manage. In addition, an alternative solution may be easier and 
faster to contract than if the contracts were large and/or technically complex.
- Reduced corruption potential
Small-sized contracts and the potential for more firms to bid for them make corruption 
both less likely to occur and less severe when/if it occurs. 
28 
A report by the Ontario Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters outlines  
six steps for smarter spending and leveraging the strategic role of public procurement by provincial 
governments, including “improved access to procurement opportunities for small and medium enterprises” 
(Deyanska, Hjartarson and Holmes 2014).
29 
Australia and Canada share many similarities, including their size, economic structure, prominent extractive 
sectors and ambitious plans to improve their lacklustre innovation performance. In 2017, the Innovation 
and Science Australia board released “Australia 2030: “Prosperity through Innovation”, a report outlining 
Australia’s plan to “become a top-tier innovator by 2030”. The plan identifies procurement, particularly 
from SMEs, as a “strategic lever” for innovation. Recommendation 14 sets a procurement target of 33 per 
cent of contracts (by dollar value) to be awarded to Australian SMEs by 2022 (Innovation and Science 
Australia 2017).
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-Diversification
The procurement of a larger and more varied set of innovative solutions via small 
contracts is akin to portfolio diversification and more likely to result in identifying winners 
than a narrow focus on fewer solutions via larger contracts.
The Ministry of Government and Consumer Services Ontario and Supply Chain Ontario 
(n.d.) have released The BPS Primer on Innovation Procurement, an extensive document 
intended to help broader public-sector (BPS) organizations in Ontario design and 
conduct their procurement of innovation. The BPS Primer starts with the definition of 
innovation procurement and the circumstances in which it may be preferred to traditional 
procurement practices, followed by a list of key factors for the success of innovation 
procurement, the early market strategies to support it and a description of various 
models organizations may choose from based on their specific needs.
The following steps draw from the BPS Primer and other literature discussed above to 
outline a roadmap that public institutions can follow to increase their use of innovation 
procurement, and thus indirectly to increase the role of public procurement as an 
innovation policy tool.
The first step is for public organizations to identify their needs that existing goods 
and services cannot meet or cannot meet satisfactorily. When purchasing innovative 
solutions, it is essential to keep in mind that the final purpose is to provide an answer 
to an existing problem or need. The identification and communication of needs is 
indispensable for launching the procurement process, but it’s also critical for gaining 
public acceptance for using public money for things that have not been proven yet. 
Some countries, such as Austria, Sweden and Germany, have successfully articulated and 
included societal needs in their innovation policy agenda. The Canadian government has 
set an ambitious innovation agenda, but has yet to define specific societal challenges 
that it looks to resolve through innovation (Edler 2019).
Starting small may again be the sensible answer to this. Rather than waiting for the 
federal government to identify the big societal challenges to be solved through 
innovation, provincial and local governments and institutions can take the lead in this 
process. Starting at the grassroots level makes it easier to identify concrete challenges 
that are relevant to the local population, possible to articulate and therefore to solve.
It is important to note that procurement departments do not initiate this process. Other 
government departments, institutions, etc. must identify these needs, beginning with the 
challenges they face in meeting their mandates. These departments must work closely 
with procurement departments to see these challenges properly articulated and fulfilled 
through the procurement of novel solutions. The success of this process requires a 
smooth collaboration between these departments, and may require consulting with, and 
including procurement departments in, early decision-making processes at higher levels 
than typically expected. 
Once the needs/challenges to be met are identified, the next step is the translation of 
needs into functional specifications. This step is again significantly challenging. The 
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specifications must be general enough to allow for a variety of technical solutions, but 
concrete enough to delineate what is expected from the innovative product. Once again, 
the procurement departments are not responsible for this step, and good communication 
between them and the beneficiary department is essential for the success of this step. It 
may be helpful for provincial/municipal governments to have a specific department or 
unit with knowledge and experience in identifying and evaluating new technologies and 
technological trends to intermediate this step in the case of more complex challenges, or 
when the need for innovative solutions appears often and for challenges that are diverse.
Next comes communicating needs to the public and potential suppliers. To avoid the 
perception of unfair advantage toward some vendors, this information should be openly 
accessible to anyone interested. This step may require some institutional changes and 
more transparency and openness than public organizations are typically used to.
An effective and cheap way to engage with a large number of potential suppliers, to hear 
about emerging technologies and to uncover potential solutions is to organize reverse 
trade shows, where several public institutions or departments showcase challenges 
they are looking to solve and invite vendors to discuss them. Reverse trade shows allow 
buyers to gauge to what extent existing market solutions can answer their challenges, 
helping them prioritize those challenges based on the probability of being met. At the 
same time, and especially if organized with some degree of regularity, reverse trade 
shows give potential vendors a better idea of the public sector’s most pressing needs and 
allow them to allocate their resources and R&D efforts accordingly. 
Once the buying institutions are able to narrow down the set of challenges and potential 
solutions, they can better formulate the best procurement model that fits their needs. 
The BPS Primer draws on international experience in innovation procurement to outline 
six models the procuring organizations can start with in designing their own procurement 
processes. Each of these models involves specific steps which are not discussed here.
• R&D procurement — for the purpose of purchasing new, radically different 
solutions in the form of prototypes or first-test products, without a commitment 
to purchasing the end product on a commercial scale;
• Innovation partnership — establishing a long-term collaborative relationship 
with specific suppliers to develop a new solution from exploration, design and 
prototyping to production. It may also involve adapting existing solutions to new 
problems; 
• Design contest — participants submit design proposals or prototypes to 
compete for an award; the procuring organization may decide to enter into a 
contract with the contest winner to develop a prototype of the winning design 
and purchase the resulting solution, or may conduct the procurement separately;
• Competitive dialogue — a process through which the procuring organization 
engages in discussions with potential suppliers about different aspects of 
procurement prior to formulating their exact requirements and inviting suppliers 
to submit their proposals. This type of procurement is typically used for 
large and complex projects where it is difficult to formulate precise technical 
specifications prior to industry consultations; 
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• Competitive procedure with negotiation — a procurement process to be used 
when innovative solutions exist but there is some flexibility in the requirements 
that must be met, which allows the procuring organization and potential sellers 
to negotiate some aspects of the contract for their mutual benefit;
• Innovation-friendly competitive process — refers to the procurement of solutions 
in such a way that innovative solutions are not treated unfairly in the evaluation 
process. It is based on setting up evaluation criteria that are flexible and 
outcome-focused, allowing the organization to identify the best value solution 
and not necessarily the lowest price.
Following the preferred procurement process, an innovation solution (design idea, 
prototype or final product) is procured and the contract is awarded. The final step is 
managing the contract, making sure that the outcomes the vendor has committed to (in 
terms of quantity, quality, features, value, etc.) are delivered according to the contract. 
This also includes, where applicable, taking the necessary steps to ensure that the 
purchasing organization successfully adopts the innovative solution.
The presentation of these steps is sketchy and simplistic because innovation procurement 
is not easy. It is more complex than traditional procurement due to the novelty element 
that inherently involves taking risks and spending more. It is arguably easier to procure 
innovative solutions when there are no proven solutions to a particular problem, because 
there will be less resistance to change within the departments involved. When existing 
solutions work reasonably well, it will likely be considerably harder to convince these 
departments of the necessity to adopt better solutions for the sake of the collective good 
represented by the innovation spillovers that everyone else will enjoy. 
For this reason, increasing the scope of using public procurement for innovation first 
requires innovation champions at the highest level, the decision-makers in charge of 
looking at the bigger picture who can ensure the collaboration of the different branches 
of government. They also must be able to weigh the potential increase in costs from 
procuring innovative solutions in some areas against potential savings in other areas.
A single government department, whether provincial or municipal, may not have the skill, 
the budget capacity or the willingness to undertake the procurement of a new, innovative 
and potentially more costly solution without support at the highest level of government 
and without collaboration with other departments. Likewise, procurement departments 
cannot be expected to be the champions of taking risks through innovative but likely 
more costly solutions, given their responsibility to spending wisely.
For the procurement of innovation to happen and for government officials at the 
highest level to champion the use of public procurement as a tool of innovation policy, 
the public must be convinced that this is a good use of its funds. One useful step is to 
widely publicize success stories. Some provinces are doing a better job than others in 
showcasing their successes. Some co-ordination among provinces and municipalities in 
sharing each other’s stories, or perhaps a national directory listing all these stories, could 
help increase their visibility and the public’s acceptance for spending more for the sake 
of newer, better solutions and benefits from these innovations.
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Focusing on the procurement of innovative solutions from small and medium-sized 
enterprises can help achieve a higher level of public support, both because the public 
relates better to SMEs, and also because the perceived risk of trying something new is 
smaller. Adding some green and social objectives can further increase public support for 
innovation procurement.
Such support may also be easier to achieve if the additional cost of procuring novel 
solutions is not too high, or, better yet, is financed through a redeployment of existing 
government spending. As noted above, Canada already spends more than other OECD 
countries on indirect R&D support in the form of R&D tax credits, both at the federal and 
provincial levels. There is a host of other innovation policies and initiatives at federal, 
provincial and even municipal levels, not always with clear objectives and/or proven 
results. In addition, increasing the support for small and medium-sized enterprises is a 
priority at all levels of government.
A critical review of some of these programs and a redeployment of funds from the least 
successful programs to the procurement of innovation could mean that authorities can 
stimulate innovation through procurement without any additional spending. 
The federal government could incentivize provincial and municipal governments and 
organizations to procure innovative solutions by setting up a matching grant. The federal 
government would cover a given share of the cost of procurement, say 30 per cent, if it 
fulfils certain criteria, for example, if it involves purchasing a product from a SME that has 
not been sold commercially before. 
The provincial governments could set up similar grants for municipalities. In addition, 
they may consider establishing a department to help provincial and municipal institutions 
and organizations identify and articulate some of their unmet challenges and to 
intermediate the purchasing of solutions, similar to what Innovate Solutions does at the 
federal level.
All large cities in Canada are looking for ways to attract investment and become 
innovation hubs. The City of Calgary, with a downtown office space vacancy rate of 
more than 24 per cent (DaSilva 2019), is perhaps more interested than most in attracting 
investment and embracing innovation to diversify its economy away from the struggling 
energy sector. Calgary’s difficult financial position may make it challenging to convince 
the public of the need to spend more to purchase solutions to boost innovation. However, 
through Calgary Economic Development, the city has a plan to spend $100 million 
“to attract and support transformative investments in the city” via the Opportunity 
Calgary Investment Fund (OCIF). The targets for OCIF funding are “innovative and 
catalytic projects” in Calgary that create jobs and economic benefits in the city. To date, 
approximately $23.5 million has been awarded for nine projects (Calgary Economic 
Development n.d.). The city appears to have in mind large, impactful investment projects 
(only three of the nine projects to date have been awarded less than $1 million). At the 
moment, the intake of applications has been paused due to the high level of uncertainty 
created by the COVID-19 pandemic and the low oil price environment. 
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One significant difficulty in attracting large, impactful investors and projects is that many 
other jurisdictions compete for them, often by offering facilities they can hardly afford. 
An extreme example of this race to the bottom is the recent bid to attract the Amazon 
second headquarters (HQ2), for which 238 cities submitted proposals, including more 
than 10 cities in Canada, with Calgary among them (CBC 2017). Some US states offered 
billions of dollars in incentives to support their bid. In the end, Virginia won the race due 
in part to its workforce advantages (Cohn 2019).
A different approach to stimulate innovation and create local jobs would be to redeploy a 
share of these funds toward purchasing innovative solutions from local innovative SMEs. 
If, for example, 10 per cent of OCIF would be set aside specifically for SMEs, and awarded 
a maximum of $75,000 per contract,30 Calgary could potentially buy innovative solutions 
from more than 130 local SMEs. Moreover, these innovative solutions could be procured 
in response to specific challenges identified by the city, making this program even more 
relevant for the locals. 
For challenges that require tech solutions, Calgary could launch its own iteration of the 
Start-up in Residence program, already explored in Edmonton, in British Columbia and 
in many other North American cities. With an award of only $10,000, the city could seek 
solutions to a variety of challenges at a relatively small cost, while helping small and 
medium-sized local businesses to innovate, test their ideas and gain valuable experience.
Perhaps through creative and innovative procurement, Calgary could find innovative and 
scalabale solutions for challenges such as the stockpile of plastic clamshells that the city 
accumulated for almost two years in the absence of a recycling solution (CBC 2019),31 
or to some of the many concerns raised by residents in the thousands of 311 service 
requests placed monthly on issues related to waste management, roads and parks 
maintenance, and many others (City of Calgary 2020).
At the provincial level, resurrecting the ASBIRI program and its scope to encourage not 
just the private sector, but also the provincial government to procure innovative solutions 
for some of its challenges could be an important step in boosting innovation and 
economic diversification in Alberta. This could also help the government achieve better 
value for the money in the form of tailored solutions to some specific problems, in line 
with the Blue Ribbon Panel on Alberta’s Finances’ recommendations.
While these proposals sound Alberta-specific, they are equally applicable to other 
Canadian provinces and municipalities, each facing unique challenges, but all of whom 
are seeking ways to improve their innovation performance, foster economic growth, and 
get more bang for their buck. Public procurement is a powerful tool in the innovation 
toolkit that Canadian provincial and local governments, for the most part, have not used 
30 
This is the maximum amount for which local firms can be given preference under the New West Partnership 
Agreement, the Canadian Free Trade Agreement and the Canada- European Union Comprehensive and 
Economic Trade Agreement. 
31 
The City of Calgary has spent more than $300,000 over the past two years to store 2,000 tonnes of  
plastic clamshells, after China stopped importing them in September 2017. Absent a solution to recycle the 
clamshells collected prior to April 2019, it appears that the city will have to spend $130,000 to bury them in 
the landfill. 
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to its full potential. As the earlier literature survey suggests, public procurement can be 
particularly helpful to boost innovation for small, new firms. Local governments may be in 
the best positions to drive innovation through procurement, given their close proximity to 
citizen concerns and their more streamlined processes, which should be easier to reform 
(Brown 2014). 
VII. CONCLUSION
Public procurement is potentially the most powerful, yet currently underutilized, tool for 
stimulating innovation from the demand side. It also represents a significant departure 
from the Canadian tradition of using mostly supply-side instruments like R&D tax credits 
to encourage innovation by reducing its costs, mostly with underwhelming results.
Almost 90 per cent of public procurement in Canada is undertaken by provincial and 
municipal governments. Therefore, the largest potential for using public procurement 
for innovation in Canada is at the subnational level, in the areas under the control of 
provincial and municipal governments: education, health care, social services and 
municipal affairs. 
Despite its promise, provincial and municipal governments show little evidence of using 
their procurement powers specifically for innovation. This is partly due to the traditional 
view of public procurement’s role as purchasing the lowest cost, safest solutions that 
answer the public sector’s needs.
To take advantage of the potentially large role that procurement could play in solving 
Canada’s innovation problem, innovation should be included as a specific mandate of 
the procurement process. In addition, procurement departments and processes would 
have to embrace the additional risks and increased costs that come with procuring 
innovative solutions. 
Not all domains of responsibility for the provincial and municipal government are equally 
suitable for innovation. The focus must be placed on the areas which would benefit most 
from innovation — where either there are no existing products for specific needs, or 
where their performance is unsatisfactory, and/or the risks of adopting novel solutions 
are not too high. 
A good place to start is by creating more opportunities for SMEs to participate in public 
tenders. Focusing on smaller challenges reduces the risks, increases the probability of 
identifying successful innovations from a larger pool of candidates and makes it easier 
to comply with procurement thresholds set up in the trade agreements that Canada and 
individual provinces have signed.
Provincial and municipal governments, Crown corporations and organizations in the 
MASH sector should start by identifying the challenges they are looking to address, 
communicating these challenges clearly and openly and setting up their procurement 
processes so as to allow for the acquisition of innovative solutions to these challenges. 
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To incentivize the procurement of innovative products, the federal, provincial and 
municipal governments should consider setting up matching grant programs or specific 
funds dedicated to the procurement of new-to-the-market goods and services. Having 
access to additional funds will make it easier for public-sector buyers to seek and 
embrace new, innovative, but potentially more expensive solutions that better respond 
to their needs. This financial support does not necessarily require additional government 
spending. Governments at all levels can start by identifying existing programs in support 
of innovation, investment, economic diversification, SMEs, etc. that are underperforming, 
and reallocate some of those funds toward supporting the procurement of innovative 
products from SMEs. 
Using public procurement strategically as an innovation tool is ultimately possible 
only if the importance of innovation as an outcome of the procurement process is 
recognized at the highest level of decision-making. Various government departments 
must collaborate to ensure the success of innovation procurement. The additional costs 
and potential savings may occur in different areas. Decision-makers must co-ordinate 
these aspects with the larger picture in mind — that buying innovative goods and 
services serves more than the particular government unit they are intended for. Used 
wisely, public procurement may be an answer to Canada’s perpetually disappointing 
innovation performance. 
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